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 1 
HOW MUCH CAN DUMB PIPES KNOW? BMG V. COX AND 
WHY A KNOWLEDGE BAR TO DMCA SAFE HARBOR FOR 
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS IS INAPPROPRIATE 
ERIK ESTRADA, CAITLIN CRONIN, AND BILL GILLESPIE† 
In November 2015, in BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox 
Commc'ns, Inc.,1 the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia announced a legal standard that if widely adopted would un-
do the tiered safe harbor protections afforded online service providers 
(OSPs) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). These 
services have different functions, capabilities, and needs. Recognizing 
that one size does not fit all for OSPs, Title II of the DMCA (codified at 
17 U.S.C. § 512) sets out different safe harbor qualifications for four 
different types of services: (1) transitory digital network communications 
(ISPs);2 (2) system caching (transitory storage);3 (3) information residing 
on systems or networks at direction of users (content hosts—websites, 
etc.);4 and (4) information location tools (search engines).5 However § 
512 does require that at a minimum all OSPs “adopt[] and reasonably 
implement[], and inform[] subscribers and account holders of . . . a poli-
cy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of sub-
scribers and account holders . . . who are repeat infringers.”6 Despite 
Congress’s intent to differentiate between the four services, the court in 
BMG v. Cox used the termination policy requirement to impute a stand-
ard from §§ 512(c) and (d)—a lack of actual knowledge—to §§ 512(a) 
and (b). Other courts should not adopt this standard for ISP termination 
policies but should apply a stricter standard when the service is just In-
ternet access. 
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 1. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 634 (E.D. Va. 
2015). 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2012).  
 3. Id. § 512(b). 
 4. Id. § 512(c). 
 5. Id. § 512(d). 
 6. Id. § 512(i). 
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The ruling on safe harbor protections for ISPs is likely an example 
of the axiom “bad facts make bad law.” BMG is a copyright owner that 
employs Rightscorp to enforce its copyrights.7 Rightscorp sent notices to 
Cox, an ISP, which Cox did not forward to its customers.8 BMG sued, 
and Cox claimed immunity under the DMCA’s ISP safe harbor provi-
sion, § 512(a).9 Cox’s refusal to pass on the notices was not central to the 
court’s DMCA holding; it merely showed that Cox was aware that BMG 
believed its copyrights had been infringed.10 What mattered more for the 
§ 512 holding were Cox’s policies for repeat infringers and its internal 
communications showing that such policies either were legal fig leaves 
or only enforced with a wink and a nod.11 On the record, it appears that 
Cox claimed ISP safe harbor while not complying with the spirit of the 
DMCA’s grant of such safe harbor.  
The court in BMG v. Cox probably reached the right result, but it 
reached it in the wrong way; the court could have reached the same result 
without ignoring the plain text of the DMCA. The court acknowledged 
that the Cox services at issue in the case fit the § 512(a) safe harbor, then 
correctly stated that for any of the § 512(a)–(d) safe harbors to apply, the 
provider must comply with § 512(i).12 The court’s analysis of § 512(i) is 
where it departs from the plain text of the statute. Because this case is the 
first where a court has analyzed § 512(i) for a service receiving § 512(a) 
safe harbor, the court relied on § 512(i) analysis from cases involving 
services receiving § 512(c) and § 512(d) safe harbor.13 Such cases proba-
bly give adequate guidance as to splitting § 512(i)’s requirement for a 
reasonably implemented termination policy into two questions: (1) did 
the service provider implement its policy; and (2) was the service pro-
vider’s policy reasonable?14 Further, applying such cases to the analysis 
of whether a provider has implemented its policy is appropriate insofar 
as: (1) a provider’s notification system must be functional; (2) a provider 
must have a procedure for dealing with notifications; (3) a provider 
“must ‘not actively prevent copyright owners from collecting infor-
  
 7. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 634, 638 (E.D. 
Va. 2015). 
 8. Id. at 642. Rightscorp reportedly sent 2.5 million notices to Cox. Id. at 640. 
 9. Id. at 653. 
 10. See id. at 654, 655. 
 11. Id. at 655–61. 
 12. Id. at 653. 
 13. Id. at 653–54. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC is a § 512(c) case: The Ninth Circuit found 
that CCBill did not qualify for § 512(d) safe harbor, and could not determine if it qualified for § 
512(a) safe harbor, but did find that CWIE qualified for § 512(c) safe harbor. Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1116–18 (9th Cir. 2007). Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp. and 
Capitol Records, LLC v. Escape Media Grp. are also § 512 (c) cases. Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013); Capitol 
Records, LLC v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., No. 12-CV-6646 AJN, 2015 WL 1402049, at *13 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015). Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes is a § 512(c) and § 512(d) case. Capi-
tol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) on reconsideration in 
part, No. 07 CIV. 9931 WHP, 2013 WL 1987225 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013). 
 14. BMG, 149 F. Supp. 3d  at 653–54. 
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mation needed to issue such notifications’”; and (4) the penalty for repeat 
infringers must be termination when appropriate circumstances exist.15 
However, the court inappropriately relied on these cases in determining 
that “appropriate circumstances” for termination means when an ISP has 
actual knowledge that a user is a repeat copyright infringer. In § 512(n) 
Congress expressly said that: 
Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) describe separate and distinct func-
tions for purposes of applying this section. Whether a service provid-
er qualifies for the limitation on liability in any one of those subsec-
tions shall be based solely on the criteria in that subsection, and shall 
not affect a determination of whether that service provider qualifies 
for the limitations on liability under any other such subsection.16  
Thus, analyses of §§ 512(c) and 512(d) cannot be properly applied 
to §§ 512(a) and (b) where the requirements of subsections (c) and (d) 
differ from the requirements of subsections (a) and (b).17 The text of § 
512 makes clear that an actual knowledge standard is required for ser-
vices falling under §§ 512(c)–(d), but not for services that receive safe 
harbor under §§ 512(a)–(b).  
The actual knowledge standard applied was inappropriate under the 
DMCA because Congress purposefully did not apply an actual 
knowledge standard to ISPs, but it did to content hosts and search en-
gines. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that “where 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”18 Here, there is a requirement that providers of a service fall-
ing within §§ 512(a) or 512(b) lack actual knowledge of the infringing 
activity,19 but there is no such requirement in §§ 512(a) and 512(b).20 
Moreover, the rule against surplusage “directs courts to give effect to 
each word used by the legislature.”21 The Supreme Court has clarified 
that the rule against surplusage is not an absolute: The rule should not be 
applied in cases where the text is clear if the word is superfluous but 
would be ambiguous after applying the rule.22 This is not the case with 
§ 512.23 Accordingly, the rule against surplusage should preclude an in-
terpretation that reads a requirement that all OSPs lack actual knowledge 
of the infringing activities into § 512(i), where such a requirement is 
  
 15. Id. 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 512(n) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 17. See id. 
 18. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (alteration and original quotation marks 
omitted). 
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i); 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(A). 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a); 17 U.S.C. § 512(b). 
 21. Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 576 F.3d 691, 699 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 22. Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004). 
 23. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(b) with 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d). 
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explicit in §§ 512(c) and (d), but conspicuously absent from §§ 512(a) 
and (b).24  
On top of the rules for statutory construction, there are important 
policy reasons why the actual knowledge standard is inappropriate for 
ISP safe harbor. Section 512 “is intended to preserve incentives for 
online service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and 
address copyright infringements that occur in the digital networked envi-
ronment.”25 But “OSPs and ISPs need[] more certainty in this area in 
order to attract the substantial investments necessary to continue the ex-
pansion and upgrading of the Internet.”26 Nevertheless, “those who re-
peatedly or flagrantly abuse their access to the Internet through disre-
spect for the intellectual property rights of others should know that there 
is a realistic threat of losing that access.”27 It is clear that § 512 is intend-
ed to strike a balance between the rights of copyright holders and OSPs’ 
abilities to enforce those rights. Of course, there are at least four kinds of 
OSP, and each type functions differently.28 The actual knowledge stand-
ard does not overburden content hosts and search engines, which can 
easily view the content they host or reference; they need only click a link 
or load the webpage. ISPs, on the other hand, are dumb pipes.29 Because 
ISPs exercise no editorial control,30 merely pass information from one 
user to another at the direction of the user,31 and the transmitted material 
is not “ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipi-
ents,”32 ISPs cannot simply view content that a copyright holder claims 
infringes their copyright. Nor does society want ISPs to view the con-
tents of all of the packets sent through their pipes.33 Moreover, because 
the ISP does not store the information, the ISP must take the copyright 
  
 24. Id.  
 25. 144 Cong. Rec. S11887-01 (daily ed. Oct 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 26. 144 Cong. Rec. S11887-01 (daily ed. Oct 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 27. H.R. REP. 105-551(II), at 61 (1998). 
 28. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)–(d).  
 29. Dumb pipes are transport “that route[] signals from point A to point B.” Am. Broad. 
Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2515 (2014). Dumb pipes “exercise no editorial 
control.” Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. F.C.C., 597 F.3d 1306, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 30. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)(2), (a)(5). 
 31. Id. §§ 512(a)(1), (a)(3). 
 32. Id. § 512(a)(4). 
 33. Information travels over the Internet in packets; think of them as letters sent through the 
mail. Susan Landau, National Security on the Line, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 409, 424 
(2006). A packet transports the data (a message) in its body (the envelope), and the packet header 
(address/return address) tells the network where to send it. Murat Torlak, Professor, U. Tex. Dall., 
Packet Switching and Computer Networks, 4, 
https://www.utdallas.edu/~torlak/courses/ee4367/lectures/packet.pdf. ISPs need to read the packet 
header (the address)—through an automated process—to route the packet to the correct destination. 
See Manish Kumar, Constitutionalizing E-Mail Privacy by Informational Access, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 257, 283 (2008). However, technology exists that enables ISPs to inspect the content of 
packets (i.e., look inside the envelope, at the contents of messages) if so compelled. Rob Frieden, 
Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power 
Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 633, 652 (2008). 
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holder’s word that the material was infringing.34 That can be problematic 
because even if the user transmitted copyrighted material, the use may 
not be infringing at all, but rather a fair use.35 Of course, there is no re-
quirement for a copyright holder to conduct a fair use analysis before 
sending an infringement claim to an ISP, as there is for content hosts and 
search engines.36 In short, reading an actual knowledge standard into § 
512(a) is impracticable, creates perverse incentives, and will unduly bur-
den ISPs. 
So with the balance between protecting copyright and developing 
infrastructure in mind, what is the appropriate standard by which to de-
termine if termination is appropriate? The court cited Nimmer on Copy-
right, saying that there was a spectrum of meanings for “repeat infring-
er”: At one end, there is an adjudicated infringer; at the other, there is an 
accused infringer; in the middle, there is the accused infringer that the 
provider actually knows is a repeat infringer.37 Cox asked the court to 
hold that the user must be an adjudicated infringer before an ISP must 
terminate her.38 This would certainly be more practicable and a much 
lesser burden on ISPs, and it would be appropriate under the plain text of 
§ 512. However, courts will not likely adopt this standard because it 
shifts the burden to the courts. Thus, for § 512(i) analysis of a § 512(a) 
provider, courts should adopt a standard that falls somewhere between an 
adjudicated infringer—which would overburden courts—and an accused 
infringer that the provider actually knows is a repeat infringer—which 
would overburden ISPs and is impermissible by the plain text of § 512. 
For example, the standard could be a summary judgment standard—e.g., 
there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” that the user is a repeat 
infringer, there is not even a colorable argument that the use was nonin-
fringing.39 Cox would likely have still lost safe harbor under this stand-
ard, but such a standard would be consistent with the text and policy of § 
512. But the proper standard is for the courts to determine; this paper 
simply argues that it must be higher than actual knowledge. 
Courts should adopt a standard that is higher than the actual 
knowledge standard. By doing so, courts can comply with the text of the 
statute and better adhere to the spirit of § 512 by preserving the tiered 
safe harbor protections, balancing the needs of ISPs with those of copy-
right holders, and making it clear to repeat infringers that they may lose 
their access to the Internet if they persist in downloading/sharing copy-
righted material. 
  
 34. Unless of course the user confesses. 
 35. See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 36. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) and 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3) with 17 U.S.C. § 512(b). 
 37. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 634, 654 (E.D. 
Va. 2015). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
